Qt54h140j3, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
#Learning on the job optimal contract series
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series Card, David & Cardoso, Ana Rute & Heining, Joerg & Kline, Patrick, 2016.David Card & Ana Rute Cardoso & Jörg Heining & Patrick Kline, 2017.ĩ76, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
" Firms and Labor Market Inequality: Evidence and Some Theory,"ĩ850, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). Card, David & Cardoso, Ana Rute & Heining, Jörg & Kline, Patrick, 2016.We evaluate the effects of redistributive policies and find that almost 40% of government-provided insurance is undone by crowding out firm-provided insurance. A large share of the earnings growth variance can be attributed to job mobility, which interacts with productivity shocks. The estimates indicate that firms absorb persistent worker and firm shocks, with respective passthrough values of 27 and 11%, but price permanent worker differences, a large contributor (32%) to variations in wages.
The structural model is estimated on matched employer-employee data from Sweden. We prove that there exists a unique spot target wage, which serves as an attraction point for smooth wage adjustments. In equilibrium, riskneutral firms provide only partial insurance against shocks to risk-averse workers and offer contingent contracts, where payments are backloaded in good times and frontloaded in bad times.
We develop an equilibrium search model with worker and firm shocks and characterize the optimal contract offered by competing firms to attract and retain workers. This paper examines how employer- and worker-specific productivity shocks transmit to earnings and employment in an economy with search frictions and firm commitment.
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